UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For the Northern District of Illinois
Case No. 25-CV-04421
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the State's abortion restriction on the ground that it impermissibly burdens the fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The challenged statute fails both the strict-scrutiny analysis Roe demands and the undue-burden test articulated in Casey.
II. THE UNDUE-BURDEN FRAMEWORK CONTROLS
Under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), a state regulation imposes an undue burden if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy. The provision at issue here cannot survive that test.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified Casey's undue-burden inquiry in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016), holding that courts must weigh the asserted benefits of an abortion restriction against the burdens it imposes. The State here has offered no medical evidence that the regulation advances any legitimate interest — and the burdens fall heavily on low-income patients in rural areas of the State.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Right Is Fundamental
The constitutional right to make decisions concerning whether to terminate a pregnancy is grounded in the broader right of personal privacy first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and extended through the line of substantive due process cases culminating in Roe. As Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 explained, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
B. The Statute Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny
Where a fundamental right is burdened, the State must show that its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The State's purported interest in fetal viability does not justify the broad pre-viability prohibition the statute imposes. Under the trimester framework, restrictions in the first trimester are presumptively invalid — a presumption the State has not rebutted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged statute pending final resolution on the merits.