UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Ninth Circuit
No. 25-7341
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in admitting Appellant's custodial statement obtained in violation of the rule established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a suspect in custody invokes his right to counsel, all interrogation must cease until counsel is present or the suspect initiates further communication.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The Edwards Bright-Line Rule Bars Re-Approach
Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), once Appellant invoked his right to counsel at 14:22, all subsequent police-initiated questioning was per se inadmissible. The interrogating officer's second approach at 15:47 — without counsel present — squarely violates this rule. See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (Edwards bar extends to interrogation about unrelated offenses).
B. The Officer's Statements Constituted Interrogation
The government's position that Officer Sanchez merely made "conversational remarks" cannot survive the functional definition of interrogation set out in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response constitute interrogation. Officer Sanchez's remarks about the victim's grieving family fall on the wrong side of that line.
C. The Government's Reliance on Vega Is Misplaced
The government cites Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022) for the proposition that Miranda violations no longer trigger any judicial remedy. That is not what Vega holds. Vega addressed only whether a Miranda violation can support a civil claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 — it did not disturb the exclusionary remedy that has been Miranda's enforcement mechanism for sixty years. The Court reaffirmed in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) that Miranda "announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively" — and Vega expressly preserved that conclusion. Suppression remains the constitutionally mandated remedy in criminal proceedings.
D. The Public Safety Exception Does Not Apply
The narrow exception recognized in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) requires an objectively reasonable belief that immediate questioning is necessary to neutralize an ongoing danger to officers or the public. No such danger existed here: Appellant was handcuffed, the scene was secured, and forty minutes had elapsed since the initial arrest. The exception cannot bear the weight the government places on it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and remand for a new trial with the unconstitutionally obtained statement excluded from evidence.